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LAWRENCE v. FLORIDA:
APPLICATIONS FOR POSTCONVICTION RELIEF ARE
“PENDING” UNDER THE AEDPA
ONLY UNTIL FINAL JUDGMENT IN
STATE COURT
ELIZABETH RICHARDSON-ROYER*

I. INTRODUCTION
On February 20, 2007, the Supreme Court announced its decision
in Lawrence v. Florida,1 seeking to address confusion surrounding the
tolling of a one-year statute of limitations applicable to federal habeas
corpus petitions. Prior to Lawrence, a split had developed among the
Circuits regarding whether tolling should be available while a
prisoner requests, and the Supreme Court considers whether to grant,
review of state post-conviction proceedings. On one hand, the
Eleventh Circuit and several other circuits have held that the statute
of limitations could only be tolled until the final resolution of an
application for state post-conviction relief in state court.2 On the
other hand, the Sixth Circuit reached the opposite conclusion prior to
Lawrence, finding that an application for state post-conviction relief
would remain pending—and would therefore toll the statute of
limitations—during review by the Supreme Court.3
The Supreme Court settled the issue in a 5-4 decision that rejected
the Sixth Circuit’s logic and affirmed that of the Eleventh Circuit. The
majority opinion took a rather formalistic approach to the statutory
* 2007 J.D./L.L.M. Candidate, Duke University School of Law.
1. Lawrence v. Florida, 127 S. Ct. 1079 (2007).
2. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Florida, 421 F.3d 1221 (11th Cir. 2005); Miller v. Dragovich, 311
F.3d 574 (3d Cir. 2002); Smaldone v. Senkowski, 273 F.3d 133 (2d Cir. 2001); Ott v. Johnson, 192
F.3d 510 (5th Cir. 1999).
3. Abela v. Martin, 348 F.3d 164, 170 (6th Cir. 2003).

DO NOT DELETE

68

12/30/2008 12:24:36 PM

DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY SIDEBAR

VOL. 2:67

interpretation at hand in holding that the tolling of the statute of
limitations was available only during pendency of post-conviction
proceedings in state court. The Court was not persuaded by the
numerous policy arguments advanced in support of a broader
interpretation for the availability of tolling.
II. BACKGROUND
A

Statutory Language

Section 2244(d)(1) of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”)4 establishes a one-year statute of
limitations for filing an application for federal habeas relief. The one
year period runs from “the date on which the judgment became final
by the conclusion of direct review.”5 However, section 2244(d)(2)
provides that the statute of limitations may be tolled for “[t]he time
during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or
other collateral review with respect to the judgment or claim is
pending . . . .”6 The central question for the Lawrence Court in
interpreting these provisions was the following: When is an
application for state post-conviction relief still “pending” under the
AEDPA?
B. Factual and Procedural Background
The petitioner, Gary Lawrence, who, along with his wife, killed a
man using a baseball bat and a pipe, was convicted of first-degree
murder and sentenced to death by a Florida trial court. On appeal, the
Florida Supreme Court affirmed Lawrence’s conviction and
sentence.7 Three hundred and sixty-four days later (one day short of
the one-year statute of limitations for filing a federal habeas corpus
petition), Lawrence filed his application for state post-conviction
relief in Florida trial court. That application was denied and the
8
Florida Supreme Court once again affirmed his conviction.

4. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat.
1214 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C. and 28 U.S.C.).
5. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1).
6. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2).
7. Lawrence v. Florida, 421 F.3d 1221, 1223 (11th Cir. 2005).
8. Lawrence v. State, 831 So. 2d 121 (Fla. 2002) (per curiam).
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Lawrence then filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme
Court and, upon the Court’s denial of certiorari, an application for
federal habeas relief in district court. The District Court, finding that
Lawrence had expended 364 days of his one-year period before filing
for state post-conviction relief and had then waited another 113 days
after the state post-conviction proceedings were finalized before filing
9
for federal habeas relief, denied his application as time barred.
Relying on clear precedent holding that section 2244(d)’s statute of
limitations was not tolled by pendency of a petition for certiorari to
the Supreme Court, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the District Court’s
dismissal of Lawrence’s application for habeas relief.10 Lawrence’s
subsequent petition for certiorari was granted,11 and oral argument
took place on October 31, 2006.
III. HOLDING & RATIONALE
The majority, in an opinion by Justice Thomas, held that a state
court decision did not remain “pending” upon petition for review by
the Supreme Court and therefore that section 2244(d)(2) permitted
no tolling of the one-year statute of limitations after a state court’s
final resolution of an application for post-conviction relief.12 The
Court’s opinion relied heavily upon the plain language of the
statutory provisions in question, as well as upon analogy to other
sections within the AEDPA. With regards to matters of policy, the
Court attempted to respond to concerns voiced by the dissent, but
advanced few persuasive policy rationales in support of its own
approach.
As an initial matter, the Court stated that, “[r]ead naturally, the
text of the statute must mean that the statute of limitations is tolled
only while state courts review the application.”13 This reading was
required, according to the Court, not only because of prior Supreme
Court precedent describing a “pending” case as one that has not been
finally resolved by state post-conviction procedures, but also because
exhaustion requirements of state remedies do not contemplate claims

9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

Lawrence, 421 F.3d at 1223.
Id. (relying upon Coates v. Byrd, 211 F.3d 1225 (11th Cir. 2000) (per curiam)).
Lawrence v. Florida, 126 S. Ct. 1625 (2006) (mem.).
Lawrence v. Florida, 127 S. Ct. 1079, 1083 (2007).
Id.
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14
that could be simultaneously pending and exhausted. The latter was
an argument that had been strongly emphasized by Florida, as well as
other states.15
In addition, the Court placed significant weight on Congress’s use
of different language to start the statute of limitations running (at the
“conclusion of direct review”) and to toll it (while the application is
“pending”). This “linguistic difference,” according to the Court, was
“not insignificant.”16 The Court found that section 2263, which
addresses an opt-in provision for states that meet certain
requirements of providing post-conviction counsel to prisoners, had
“more analogous” language to that of section 2244(d).17 Because
section 2263 permits tolling only until “the final State court
18
disposition of [a] petition,” the Court read the language in section
2244(d) as permitting only the same.19
With an eye toward policy, petitioner Lawrence argued that if the
tolling did not include the time during which the Supreme Court
considered a petition for certiorari, state prisoners would be required
to make two filings simultaneously (if they wished to preserve them at
all): a certiorari petition from state post-conviction proceedings and a
federal habeas application. The Court rejected this argument,
primarily on the basis that Congress had intended section 2263 of the
AEDPA to preclude Supreme Court review of state post-conviction
proceedings from tolling the statute of limitations. According to the
Court, “[b]ecause Congress was not concerned by this potential for
awkwardness in § 2263, there is no reason for us to construe the
20
statute to avoid it in § 2244(d)(2).”
The Court was likewise unpersuaded by any argument that dual
filings would create duplicitous matters with both a federal district
court and the Supreme Court engaging in similar analysis

14. In addition to the logical incongruities that would result from permitting the
designation of “pending” cases as having exhausted remedies, the Court also noted that the
statute itself seeks to prevent such a result: “AEDPA’s exhaustion provision and tolling
provision work together.” Id.
15. See Brief of the States of Alabama, Arkansas et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondent, Lawrence v. Florida, 127 S. Ct. 1079 (2007) (No. 05-8820).
16. Lawrence, 127 S. Ct. at 1084.
17. Id.
18. 28 U.S.C. § 2263(b)(2).
19. Lawrence, 127 S. Ct. at 1084.
20. Id.
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simultaneously. This line of argument was rejected because, as the
Court asserted, the likelihood of it granting certiorari in order to
review state post-conviction proceedings (rather than waiting for the
21
federal habeas proceeding) “is quite small.” Likewise, the Court
believed it unlikely that a prisoner would find himself in the odd
position of (1) lacking standing to file a petition for federal habeas
relief if the state petitions for certiorari after the prisoner prevails in
the state post-conviction proceedings and (2) being time-barred from
federal habeas relief if the Supreme Court granted certiorari and
decided in favor of the state.22 “We cannot,” wrote the Court, “base
our interpretations of the statute on an exceedingly rare inequity . . .
.”23 In addition, the Court noted that in the rare situations when there
did exist some threat of duplicate work, federal district courts would
have the option of staying habeas proceedings in order to give the
Supreme Court sufficient time to decide whether to reach the merits
of a petition for certiorari.24
One concern ostensibly put to rest by the Court’s decision is that a
broader interpretation of when tolling occurs might provide an
incentive for state prisoners to file petitions for certiorari “so that
25
they receive additional time to file their habeas petitions.” This
concern, which the Court asserted lay “in contrast to the hypothetical
26
problems identified by Lawrence,” represented the sole policy
rationale underlying the majority’s opinion.
Finally, because both parties in Lawrence agreed that section
2244(d) permitted equitable tolling, the Court assumed the statute to
27
do so without deciding if it in fact did. Lawrence’s claim was,
however, quite firmly rejected when the Court found that there had
been no confusion at the time of the missed deadline and that
“attorney miscalculation is simply not sufficient to warrant equitable
tolling, particularly in the postconviction context where prisoners
28
have no constitutional right to counsel.” The Court provided no

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Id.
Id. at 1085.
Id.
Id. at 1084.
Id. at 1085.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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indication as to how it would decide the question of equitable tolling
for section 2244(d) if and when that issue arrives squarely before it.
Justice Ginsburg, writing in dissent and joined by Justices Stevens,
Souter and Breyer, argued that the majority’s reading was “neither
29
compelled by the text of § 2244(d)(2) nor practically sound.” As a
textual matter, and in contrast to the majority’s section 2263 analogy,
the dissent found that the unambiguous language in section
2263(b)(2) was evidence that if Congress had wanted to permit tolling
during State court post-conviction proceedings only, it would have
30
clearly indicated such an intent. Another difference in the approach
taken by the dissent turned upon the meaning of the phrase
“application for State post-conviction or other collateral review.”31
The majority had placed the emphasis on the word “State” and
precluded tolling during review by the Supreme Court. The dissent, on
the other hand, emphasized the word “application.” According to it,
an application for state post-conviction relief “is not transformed into
a federal application simply because the state-court applicant
petitions for [Supreme Court] review.”32
Although the dissent’s opinion did respond to the majority’s
statutory interpretation with an alternative interpretation of its own,
the strength of the opinion lay in its attention to practical application.
Ginsburg’s opinion made use of several policy considerations, the
importance and the relevance of which were denied by the majority’s
opinion. For example, Ginsburg remained concerned, both for
administrative and jurisdictional reasons, about simultaneous filings
of pleadings seeking similar relief.33 In addition, unlike the majority,
she was not concerned with inconsistency between tolling and
exhaustion because the two mechanisms “serve discrete functions and
need not be synchronized.”34 Finally, her opinion cited administrative
hassles facing judges who must determine whether to grant a stay in a
federal habeas proceeding while the Supreme Court decides whether
to grant certiorari, as well as confusion for pro se litigants unaware of
the need for duplicate petitions. Ginsburg argued that these policy

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Id. at 1090 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1088.
28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2).
Lawrence, 127 S. Ct. at 1086 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1089–90.
Id. at 1088.
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problems would cease to exist if the tolling was permitted, and she
noted that “no similar problems, practical or jurisdictional,” would
35
result had the Court adopted the dissent’s approach.
IV. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS AND CONCLUSION
The Court’s decision in Lawrence will, almost without question,
adversely affect state prisoners seeking post-conviction relief. Though
state interests in reaching final judgment—particularly in death
penalty cases—will be furthered by limited availability of tolling,
prisoners will struggle with the need to file dual petitions. Particularly
in cases in which the timing of the two filings may become an issue,
prisoners will be required to make difficult choices regarding which
filing to prioritize. Pro se litigants have long struggled with the
complexities of post-conviction self-representation even with filing
deadlines arriving one at a time. The Court’s decision in Lawrence
unnecessarily—particularly if it is based upon a reading of AEDPA
that is not required—makes the struggle more difficult.
Because both a petition for Supreme Court review of a state postconviction application and a petition for habeas corpus in federal
court are rights that prisoners possess, there is real injustice in
creating a prohibitively difficult process. By preventing the creation of
an incentive for prisoners to file petitions for certiorari, the decision
in Lawrence may accomplish just the opposite when it creates a
disincentive for prisoners to fully pursue all avenues of postconviction relief. This is a particularly dangerous and unfortunate
result when the prisoners are those with the greatest need for relief
(and those for whom a functioning post-conviction process is of
utmost importance): individuals who have been sentenced to death.
In addition to affecting prisoners and their representatives, the
decision in Lawrence may also strain judicial resources and force
judges to rule on countless motions to stay filed by prisoners awaiting
the Supreme Court’s decision on a petition for certiorari. Permitting
two courts to simultaneously hear similar or nearly identical claims
may also interfere with principles of comity and with the finality of
judgments.

35. Id. at 1090.
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A final effect of the Court’s holding in Lawrence may be to render
equitable tolling less available to prisoners who have inadvertently
36
run afoul of time limitations. Before Lawrence, it was at least
arguable that equitable tolling could apply when a prisoner’s reliance
upon a State’s guarantee of assistance was a full or a partial cause for
a missed deadline.37 With Lawrence’s holding that equitable tolling
was unavailable to Lawrence, it now seems that being “affirmative[ly]
38
misled” in a way that might give rise to equitable tolling requires
something more than a state’s promise to monitor counsel’s quality of
representation.

36. The Court’s holding on the issue of equitable tolling may be of limited significance in
the event that a later decision renders equitable tolling simply unavailable for AEDPA’s statute
of limitations for federal habeas petitions.
37. See Pliler v. Ford, 542 U.S. 225, 234 (2004) (remanding to the Ninth Circuit to consider
whether a concern that a petitioner was “affirmatively misled” by a magistrate judge was
grounds for equitable tolling); id. at 235 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (noting that equitable tolling
“might well be appropriate” if the petitioner was “affirmatively misled” by a court “or the
State”); Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Civil Liberties Union and the ACLU of Florida
in Support of Petitioner, Lawrence v. Florida, 127 S. Ct. 1079 (2007) (No. 05-8820).
38. Pliler, 542 U.S. at 234.

